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Gaius on pedantry and erudition: the quaestio lance et licio at Institutes 3.193 
 
The second-century CE jurist Gaius devotes part of Institutes book 3 to a discussion of theft 
and its legal remedies. In the course of this discussion, we are told about a type of search for 
stolen goods that was available under the laws of the Twelve Tables. Before the praetor 
introduced the so-called prohibiti furti actio (3.188 and 192),1 the Twelve Tables allowed a 
person who suspected someone of hiding a stolen good to seDUFKWKDWSHUVRQ¶VSODFH
Absolutely crucial to this provision was ³that he who wants to search should do so naked, girt 
with a licium, holding a dish. And if he should find anything, the law mandates this to be 
µPDQLIHVWWKHIW¶´ (hoc solum praecipit ut qui quaerere velit nudus quaerat licio cinctus 
lancem habens. qui si quid invenerit, iubet id lex furtum manifestum esse, 3.192).2 Perhaps not 
surprisingly, this provision puzzled Gaius and many others, including modern scholars:3 
 
3.193 quid sit autem licium quaesitum est. set verius est consuti genus esse, quo 
necessariae partes tegerentur, q r l(ex) tota ridicula est. nam qui vestitum quaerere 
prohibet, is et nudum quaerere prohibiturus est, eo magis quod ita quaesita re inventa 
maiori poenae subiciatur. deinde quod lancem sive ideo haberi iubeat, ut manibus 
occupatis nihil subiciat, sive ideo, ut quod invenerit, ibi imponat, neutrum eorum 
procedit, si id quod quaeratur, eius magnitudinis aut naturae sit, ut neque subici neque 
ibi inponi possit. certe non dubitatur, cuiuscumque materiae sit ea lanx, satis legi fieri. 
 
However, it has been asked what a licium is. But the better answer is that it is a sort of 
cloth to cover the private parts, wherefore this entire law is ridiculous. For if a person 
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prohibits someone wearing clothes from searching, he is also bound to prohibit him 
from searching naked; and all the more so because he will suffer a higher penalty if 
the thing searched for in this way is actually found.4 Next, as for the fact that it 
mandates to hold a dish, this is either so that he does not secretly bring in anything 
because his hands are occupied, or so that he can place in it what he finds; neither 
suggestion will do, if that which is sought is of such a size or nature that is does not let 
itself be smuggled or placed in it. At least it is not doubted that, whatever material the 
dish is made of, it satisfies the lex. 
 
The questions that Gaius reviews give an impression of the ancient debate, especially when 
contextualized with the discussions in his contemporaries Festus and Gellius. At the same 
WLPHWKHSDVVDJH¶VWH[WXDOSUREOHPVDQGLWVULFKKLVWRU\RIHGLWRULDOLQWHUYHQWLRQVKLJKOLJKWWKH
struggle to make sense of it from a more diachronic perspective. Even though the transmitted 
text undeniably has textual difficulties,5 I think that modern editors have created (and 
continued to debate) problems that have primarily resulted from misunderstanding the 
SDVVDJH¶VFRQWH[WERWKWKHLPPHGLDWHFRQWH[WLQ*DLXV¶ZRUNDQGWKHLQWHOOHFWXDOFRQWH[WLQ
which Gaius was active. In this paper, I will discuss two places that demand particular 
attention: the use of linteum/licium and the occurrence of q r l(ex).6 In the first case, I will 
argue that, while the MS unambiguously transmits linteum, an emendation into licium is 
warranted given that this is the jargon required here. As for q r l(ex), I will show that it is 
most plausibly resolved as quare lex, which none of the modern editions even considers; 
furthermore, careful contextualization will reveal that there are no compelling reasons to 
emend this transmitted reading.  
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The first textual difficulty concerns the word linteum/licium. Our single textual 
witness for this passage, a codex now at Verona, preserves linteum instead of licium (193, 
linteo at 192), whereas the specific provision under discussion is known as the quaestio lance 
et licio (Festus) or per lancem liciumque (Gellius).7 It seems therefore that the nouns lanx and 
licium are the technical terms by which this type of search is known. In this connection, it 
should be noted that Festus and Gellius are contemporaries of Gaius who are working outside 
the strictly juristic sphere but who are nonetheless familiar with the technical vocabulary. For 
this reason, it is implausible to presume that Gaius, who was a jurist, would be unfamiliar 
with the jargon terms.8 This point can be further substantiated by observing that Gaius wrote 
DQH[WHQVLYHFRPPHQWDU\RQWKH7ZHOYH7DEOHVRIZKLFK-XVWLQLDQ¶VDigest preserves a few 
dozen fragments.9 Since Gaius must have known the technical terms, then, most modern 
editions emend the MS reading into (a form of) licium at both 192 and 193, although Nelson 
DQG0DQWKH¶VUHFHQWeditio maior is a notable exception. 
Even though it is highly likely that Gaius knew the jargon terms, one may still counter 
that this need not imply that he actually used them. But the argument in favor of printing 
licium can be supported by at least two further observations. First and foremost, several 
places in the Institutes indicate that Gaius does not avoid or simplify jargon terms, even if 
their meaning is not entirely clear. The most relevant case in point is his discussion of an old 
type of societas known as ercto non cito (3.154a-154b).10 Rather than shunning or simplifying 
the technical language, Gaius helps the reader by elucidating the terms through (ancient) 
etymologies before laying out the doctrine. Furthermore, it is worth noting that this short 
antiquarian digression is preserved only in the fragmentary Florentine parchment folia (F), not 
in the codex Veronensis (V).11 Since there is little in V that points to a lacuna, the absence of 
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the digression may reflect an editorial intervention in V (or its lineage),12 presumably so as to 
reduce the amount of antiquarian material and jargon. If this is indeed the case, the fact that 
the societas ercto non cito has been edited out could be a parallel for the replacement of 
licium by linteum, which makes prima facie more sense given the explanation that follows 
(consuti genus). On closer inspection, however, the question that introduces the explanation 
may in fact be tailored more to the word licium. That is, apart from the tendency of the 
Institutes to preserve jargon terms, we may also find support for reading licium by looking at 
how Gaius frames WKHDQFLHQWGHEDWHDERXWWKHPHDQLQJRIWKHSURYLVLRQ¶VYRFDEXODU\:H
VKRXOGQRWHWKDWLQ*DLXV¶WLPHERWKlanx and licium are perfectly ordinary words for a dish 
and a thread, respectively, but that their meanings in the context of the Twelve Tables are 
vigorously contested and debated by ancient scholars.13 Thus Festus glosses lanx in terms of 
its function while ignoring licium,14 and Gellius mentions both terms in passing but avoids 
getting into any detail about their meanings. Gaius himself also indicates that the terms were 
debated: the phrase quid sit autem linteum/licium quaesitum est is a rather heavy-caliber 
demand for elucidation. Passive forms of the verb of quaerere, as well as the noun quaestio 
are used as technical terms to introduce legal issues that are the subject of juristic debate.15 
Gaius uses the vocabulary of quaerere throughout the Institutes in this way, and a glance at 
the Digest reveals that the terms are in general use among jurists.16 $VIRU*DLXV¶quaesitum 
est at 3.193, we should note that it asks what the licium is, rather than what purpose the licium 
serves or how it should be used. This suggests that the general semantic category of the licium 
was under discussion. Gaius at this point indicates that for him a ³cloth´ (consuti) constitutes 
the ³better´ choice (set verius est) from a range of possible answers that were apparently 
debated. In short, then, the word licium and its ordinary meaning must have posed such a 
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puzzle that a debate arose as to the general direction in which to interpret it in the context of 
the Twelve-Table provision. On the other hand, the transmitted reading linteum fits the 
scholarly quaestio much less neatly. For although it is perfectly conceivable that linteum 
would inspire debate over its use, it is harder to see why a common term for a piece of linen 
cloth, with a wide range of specific meanings, would trigger a question as to what it is, rather 
than as to how it is used or what it is used for (cf. the quaestio about the lanx later in 3.193, 
which focuses on the use).17 That is to say, the word linteum is not obscure enough in this 
context to warrant the demand for elucidation that the text features.18 In this passage, linteum 
can be explained as a gloss that ousted the technical yet more enigmatic licium at some stage 
in the transmission process. 
The other major problem in 3.193 emerges from the transmitted element q r l(ex). 
Two issues are at stake here. In the first place, there has been a lot of confusion among editors 
as to how to resolve properly the abbreviated notation q r. Secondly and relatedly, upon 
further reflection we may wonder what exactly is ridiculed in the passage, and how we are to 
UHDG*DLXV¶H[SODQDWRU\QRWHVWDUWLQJZLWKnam in connection with q r l(ex). I will discuss 
these two points in some detail, because in my view the challenges posed by the passage have 
been misconstrued in the scholarship. 
As mentioned, the codex Veronensis, the single witness for this passage, reads q r 
l(ex). While the last two letters -ex have been written in a somewhat smaller script, the shape 
of the letters and the ductus give no reason to believe that they are by a different hand.19 
Furthermore, the codex does not display any abbreviation signs at q r. To be sure, the 
nineteenth-century apographs of Böcking (1866) and Studemund (1874) both report Tժ  5֛, but 
%ULJXJOLR¶VPXOWLVSHFWUDOLPDJHVappear to indicate no abbreviation strokes, which I was able 
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to confirm through autopsy.20 Since 5֛ is generally taken to serve as the nota for res, the 
apographs have led virtually all editors to resolve q r l(ex) as quae res lex, without even 
considering alternatives.21 Yet there are strong reasons to consider quare lex as a much more 
plausible, if not the only reasonable resolution.22 First, even apart from the observation that 
the Veronensis uses notae flexibly and somewhat inconsistently, this locus in the MS does not 
seem to feature the nota for res in the first place.23 There is therefore no necessity to read res. 
Second, reading quare lex results in a perfectly syntactical phrase, whereas quae res lex 
introduces a syntactic problem (two nominative nouns) in need of fixing. Taking q r as quare, 
the text reads as follows:  
 
set verius est consuti genus esse, quo necessariae partes tegerentur, quare lex tota 
ridicula est. nam qui vestitum quaerere prohibet (...) 
 
But the better answer is that it is a sort of cloth to cover the private parts, wherefore 
this entire law is ridiculous. For if a person prohibits someone wearing clothes from 
searching (...) 
 
This reading should pose QRUHDOGLIILFXOWLHVLQWHUPVRI*DLXV¶WUDLQRIWKRXJKWQRULQWHUPVRI
syntax. The word quare marks an inferential transition that leads the reader into the next 
sentence explicating the predicate ridicula.24 As already mentioned, the whole passage makes 
good Latin, and we can find parallels of the same construction with quare and nam in other 
juristic works.25  
7 
 
At this point, it is worth articulating briefly the problems that have bedeviled the 
editorial debate on this passage. Since editors have agreed for over a century that quae res lex 
is the only possible reading, their contributions have focused on the question whether to 
delete res or lex. For example, the ever-popular Teubner edition prints quae [res]  lex tota 
ridicula est,26 while the more recent text of David reads quae res [lex]  tota ridicula est.27 
Older editions sometimes delete tota as well.28 However, we have seen that the certainty 
about quae res is misplaced on paleographical as well as grammatical grounds. These points 
in fact indicate strongly that we should consider quare lex as the transmitted reading here, and 
that the editorial debate has been misguided if not simply beside the point. On this note, I 
should emphasize that, in addressing any perceived (further) difficulties in the passage, the 
issue before us is not the editorial choice between two transmitted nominatives. Instead, I 
would like to suggest that the question we are faced with is whether or not to emend a 
grammatically sound transmitted reading. Needless to say, an emendation requires much 
stronger, i.e. compelling, arguments. 
 Apart from issues of transmission, then, what further complications may be found in 
the passage? And might these warrant an emendation? In this connection it is helpful to 
disentangle the following two qXHVWLRQV2QWKHRQHKDQGLWKDVEHHQGHEDWHGKRZ*DLXV¶
explanation starting with nam should be understood in relation to the preceding parts of the 
text. Gaius tells us that allowing a naked search is absurd because, if successful, it will lead to 
a higher penalty (fourfold, since it would be considered a case of manifestum furtum, 3.192). 
The comparative maiori poenae presupposes a lesser poena, but it remains somewhat vague 
what the exact legal form corresponding to the lower penalty is. We may think of simply 




the vocabulary of searching (nam qui vestitum quaerere prohibet) invites us to think as well 
of the search before witnesses that he discussed at 3.186: ³theft is called conceptum, when a 
VWROHQWKLQJLVVHDUFKHGIRUDQGIRXQGDWVRPHRQH¶VSODFHLQWKHSUHVHQFHRIZLWQHVVHV´ 
(conceptum furtum dicitur, cum apud aliquem testibus praesentibus furtiva res quaesita et 
inventa est).29 We hear that the penalty incurred in this case is threefold (3.191). Now, it 
VKRXOGEHFOHDUWKDWQRPDWWHUZKLFKRIWKHVHUHDGLQJVZHSUHIHUWKHSRLQWRI*DLXV¶
comment is that the search lance et licio would always have been refused,30 since, apart from 
the slightly bizarre conditions imposed on its execution, this search would entail an 
unnecessary risk for an unnecessarily high penalty. Thus the provision for this type of search, 
with all its elaborations and complications, is redundant, as it cannot solve the (supposed) 
problem it was created for. Some scholars, on the other hand, have argued that Gaius derides 
the entire situation (res [lex]  tota) in which the Twelve Tables provided for multiple types of 
search that could all be refused.31 But this view faces the following major problem: this 
interpretation only fits with the reading res; and since this second interpretation thus 
presupposes rather than justifies printing res, it fundamentally lacks the force to support an 
emendation. All things considered, then, it is not obvious that any of these understandings of 
the nam clause pose insurmountable problems with reading quare lex in the preceding clause. 
Hence, this line of argument seems to provide little ground for changing the text. 
  This brings us to a second issue that has informed the interpretation of the passage. 
Several scholars have objected to the idea that a jurist (rather than just any Roman author) 
should ridicule the Twelve Tables or one of its provisions.32 While we find plenty of 
irreverent statements about the Twelve Tables already in Plautus, a derisive rejection of (part 
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of) the Twelve Tables seems unparalleled in technical juristic discourse.33 It is likely that this 
point has had considerable weight for editors who have bracketed lex, even though most of 
them have left their reasoning implicit.34 The issue is indeed worth considering in more detail, 
especially given that Gaius throughout the Institutes shows extensive interest in the arcana of 
legal history, including all sorts of detail pertaining to the Twelve Tables. As we will see, by 
situating Gaius carefully in his intellectual context, we can garner several pieces of 
(primarily) indirect evidence suggesting that a disdainful stancHRQ*DLXV¶SDUWLVQRWDV
problematic as has been presumed. 
 )LUVWDQGIRUHPRVWZKLOH*DLXV¶GLVPLVVDODWLVXQLTXHIRUEHLQJFDVWLQVXFK
strong language, it is in fact not the only place at which he explicitly flags up his misgivings 
about a Twelve-Table provision.35 Thus the long excursus on the legis actiones at the 
beginning of the fourth book (4.11-30) is introduced and closed by statements about the 
overly strict nature of this type of legal procedure. At 4.11 we hear about a man who lost 
(perdidisse) his case against the person who cut down his vines because, in formulating the 
action, he used the word ³vines´ (vitibus succisis) rather than ³trees´ (arboribus succisis); the 
latter was the term required by the Twelve Tables. Having underscored that this slip made the 
plaintiff lose the case, Gaius sets out on an antiquarian digression about the legis actiones. In 
resuming his main exposé, Gaius reiterates that, under this procedural regime, the slightest 
error would spoil the case (qui minimum errasset, litem perderet, 4.30), and this time he adds 
that the system of legis actiones was devised with nimia subtilitas and has long since been 
replaced by the formulary system. Now, even though the sting of nimia subtilitas is very mild 
in comparison to the ridicula of Inst. 3.193, and even though the criticism is mostly deflected 
to the veteres who developed these regulations, the passage nonetheless expresses discontent 
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with the Twelve Tables and the way they facilitated the remedying of injustices.36 In short, 
WKH7ZHOYH7DEOHVFRPPDQGUHVSHFWLQ*DLXV¶ZRUNEXWWKH\DUHFHUWDLQO\QRWVDFURVDQFW 
,QWKHVHFRQGSODFHZHFDQILQGFOXHVLQWKHZRUNRIVRPHRI*DLXV¶FRQWHPSRUDULHV
that a blind reverence of the Twelve Tables came under increasing pressure during the second 
century. For instance, the Attic Nights of Gellius feature several depictions of juristic debate 
organized around a confrontation over the value of legal antiquarianism. While Gellius never 
claims to be a jurist, careful reading reveals that he possessed detailed knowledge of Roman 
law and that his text shows considerable familiarity with juristic discourse.37 Nonetheless, in 
UHDGLQJ*HOOLXVZHVKRXOGEHDZDUHWKDWKLVYLJQHWWHVRIMXULVWV¶TXDUUHOLQJRYHUWKHYDOXHRI
the Twelve Tables are indeed dramatizations involving a good deal of rhetorical enhancement 
and slanting. I do contend, however, that the resurfacing problematization of the Twelve 
7DEOHVWKURXJKRXW*HOOLXV¶ZRUNHVWDEOLVKHVDWKHPHWKDWPXVWKDYHUHVRQDWHGLQKLV
intellectual world. Two cases are particularly relevant in this connection. The first of these is 
the denunciation of the Twelve Table provision on iniuria by the character Favorinus in 
chapter 20.1. Arguing extensively with the jurist Sextus Caecilius over the value of the 
Twelve Tables, Favorinus claims that the penalty of 25 asses for iniuria is so incredibly low 
that it will not stop anyone from beating up other Romans, and that the provision is therefore 
completely ineffective. In support of his point, Favorinus quotes the Twelve-Table 
commentary of the Augustan-Age jurist Labeo (20.1.13). The quoted text reports the case of a 
man who used to hit people in the face on his walks around Rome while having his slave pay 
out 25 asses on the spot, before his victims could even consider pressing charges. Whereas 
the quote does not explicitly tell us that Labeo criticized this law, and whereas it is Favorinus 
who perhaps somewhat rhetorically claims that Labeo disagreed (non probaret), it is in fact 
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difficult to see how the commentary would not have entailed criticism (if not rejection) of the 
regulation. In any case, the debate between Caecilius and Favorinus appears to dramatize a 
tension over legal antiquarianism and the value of the Twelve Tables, for which the great 
Labeo could be enlisted as well. 38 A second place in Gellius that stages a similar clash over 
the Twelve Tables is Attic Nights 16.10. Here we encounter a jurist who, after having been 
quizzed about the meaning of certain terms in the Twelve Tables, lashes out, saying that there 
is no need for him to know about the Twelve Tables since they have been ³put to bed´ 
(consopita, 16.10.8). The only thing that matters to him is the law valid in his days (quibus 
utimur). The character Gellius gets upset and works out the meaning of the terms with the aid 
of a poet. Now, as mentioned above, I think it would be a mistake to claim that these vignettes 
constitute accurate reports of any historical juristic debates. However, since Gellius brings up 
repeatedly the theme of opposing attitudes towards the Twelve Tables, I do think that his 
sketches reflect some of the concerns and preoccupations of the intellectual world of later-
second century Rome, including the world of legal scholarship. 
This reading of dissonant and changing attitudes about legal antiquarianism fits well 
with some of the fragmentary juristic evidence. We have already seen that Labeo may have 
carped the Twelve-Table penalty on iniuria. Furthermore, a survey of the works produced by 
jurists indicates that over the course of second century legal scholarship occupied itself 
increasingly less with legal antiquarian matters.39 Gaius is for example the last jurist known to 
have written a commentary on the Twelve Tables, thus bringing to a close a tradition that 
flourished in the Republic and Early Principate.40 Along the same lines, while Gaius and his 
(near-) contemporaries Pomponius and Laelius Felix followed good tradition in writing works 
on the towering Republican jurist Q. Mucius Scaevola (consul 95 BCE), the evidence tells us 
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that they were in fact the last ones to do so. No such work is attested after about 180 CE;41 
instead, Severan jurists such as Paul and Ulpian wrote works Ad Sabinum, additions to and 
XSGDWHVRI0DVXULXV6DELQXV¶UHYROXWLRQDU\DQGKLJKO\SRpular textbook of the mid first 
century CE.42 These additions and updates are overwhelmingly legal-dogmatic: the Severan 
jurists show hardly any antiquarian or historical interest in practicing law. 
 What does this all this mean for the text of Inst. 3.193? Although the evidence 
discussed above does not provide parallels for the vitriol that characterizes *DLXV¶GHULVLRQ, it 
does indicate that jurists at times criticized and even rejected the Twelve Tables, also when 
the Twelve Tables were still a keystone of Roman legal scholarship. In my view, therefore, it 
is doubtful that there are compelling reasons to emend quare lex in order to prevent Gaius 
from calling the law ridicula. $VIRU*DLXV¶SDVVLRQate formulation, we should note that 
reading 3.193 to the end suggests that it may have been stirred not least by the (in his view) 
pointless scholarship surrounding the quaestio lance et licio: after indicating that the function 
of the lanx cannot be established, Gaius finishes on a sarcastic note by claiming that at least 
no one debates what the specific material required for the lanx is. That is, the target of 3.193 
is as much a provision whose function and meaning are beyond grasp, as it is the circle of 
pedants who are wasting their time bickering over unanswerable questions.  
All things considered, then, I do not see overwhelming problems with the transmitted 
reading quare lex tota ridicula est at Inst. 3.193, aOWKRXJK,DGPLWWKDW*DLXV¶IHUYRULV
somewhat unusual. In my view, this also puts the burden on those in favor of emending to 
prove that their views are based on more than simply their implicit assumptions and feelings 
about Gaius as an author/person. In light of the juristic papyri that keep being discovered, we 
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1
 This action was available against someone who prohibited a search for a stolen good on his 
property (Inst. 3.188). The penalty was four times the value of the item in case it was found 
(3.192). 
2
 Gaius reports that jurists debated what exactly counts as manifest theft (3.184); the matter 
revolved around the question as to what counts as ³caught in the act´ (dum fit, deprehenditur). 
3
 The text is preserved in a fifth/early sixth-century CE palimpsest codex kept in Verona 
(Biblioteca Capitolare XV (13), fol. 34v. lines 8-17), for which I have consulted 6WXGHPXQG¶V
apograph of 1874, %ULJXJOLR¶V reproductions based on multispectral imaging (2012), as well 
as the much-damaged original. The text printed above has the following emendations: licium 
instead of linteum (discussed below); verius est instead of verius seam (already suggested in 
the editio princeps, Göschen 1820); and tegerentur instead of tegerent (universally accepted 
since the second edition, Göschen 1824; the MS may in fact have a (by now indiscernible) 
abbreviation sign). The element q r l(ex) is also discussed below. In line with customary 
practice in editing juristic texts, italics indicate a supplemented letter where no ligature or 
abbreviation sign is visible. All translations are mine. 
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4
 A search would at most result in a charge for furtum conceptum, with a penalty thrice the 
value of the stolen good (3.186, 191). The search lance et licio could result in manifest theft at 
fourfold penalty (3.189-90). See further below. 
5
 See my n. 3 and 6. 
6
 Having looked at parallels in Gaius and other jurists, I see no reason to diverge from 
*|VFKHQ¶VHPHQGDWLRQRIverius seam into verius est. Hence, I will not discuss this any 
further. I also see no good reason to change, orthographically, set into sed with all recent 
editors. 
7
 Fest. 10 p. 104 L and Gell. 11.18.9 respectively; Gell. 16.10.8 has cum lance et licio. 
8
 This raises the problematic question about the sources of all three authors. Festus and 
Gellius were familiar with older lexicographers, among whom most importantly Verrius 
Flaccus (active at the time of Augustus). Gaius relied on a juristic school-text tradition 
stretching back to the first half of the first century CE (Nelson 1981, 338-70; Nelson and 
Manthe 2007, 83-86). This makes it all the more plausible that he found licium in his sources 
and hence knew the term.  
9
 7KHFRPPHQWDU\¶VGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHquaestio lance et licio does not survive. 
10
 Similar cases are the terms aes militare, aes equestre, and aes hordiarium (4.27) in the 
antiquarian excursus on the legis actiones (4.11-30).  
11
 The parchment folia, dated to the fifth century, provide parallel transmissions for only a 
few passages of the Institutes. See Nelson 1981, 55-79. 
12
 7KHUHLVQRFRPSHOOLQJVXSSRUWIRU1HOVRQ¶VYLHZWKDWDQ\LQWHUYHQWLRQPXVWJREDFNWR
Gaius himself (1981, 61, 72-5). His argument entails that the digression has been edited out 
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carefully (by changing quidem into quoque in 3.154, thus removing the expectation of the 
digression starting with autem), and that since the editor showed no care in updating outdated 
points and references he must have lived in the same period as Gaius did. However, apart 
from the non sequitur, note the problems with the idea of editorial care: (1) quidem can 
perfectly operate alone in Latin, (2) the reading quoque is in fact uncertain, and (3) the 
digression of 3.154a/b closes off the topic of societas and 3.155 starts afresh with mandatum. 
Inst. 4.16 may feature a similar divergence between V and F. 
13
 This paper focuses on the ancient debate and emphatically does not address the historical 
question as to the nature and function of the lanx and licium. Modern scholarship on the 
quaestio lance et licio is massive; Horak 1963 as well as Nelson and Manthe 2007, 284-296 
give useful overviews. Speculations include but are not limited to taking licium as a rope to 
bind the thief (Kaser 1949, 340) or to lead back stolen cattle (Jörs, Kunkel, and Wenger 1949, 
254 n. 10), an apotropaic cord (Goldmann 1925), a cultic headband (Wolf 1970) or garment 
(Manthe 2005, who perceives a connection with Pythagoreanism albeit without any real 
evidence), or as related to inlicium (Crawford 1996, 2: 617; cf. Varro, Ling. 6.88-95); lanx as 
a sacrificial bowl (Wolf 1970 et plerique) or a magical mirror (Goldmann 1925). 
14
 7KLVSDUWRI)HVWXV¶WHxt survives only in an excerpt by Paul the Deacon (eighth century 
&(ZKRPD\KDYHFXWRXW)HVWXV¶HOXFLGDWLRQRIlicium. Festus tells us that since the 
VHDUFKHUHQWHUHGVRPHRQHHOVH¶Vdomus, the lanx VKRXOGEHZRUQRYHUKLVH\HV³lest any 
matron or daughters be present´ (propter matrum familiae aut virginum praesentiam, Fest. 10 
s.v. lance et licio = p. 104 L). 
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15
 We can find dramatizations of such juristic-antiquarian discussions, on several different 
quaestiones, in the work of Gellius. Examples featuring the Twelve Tables are 16.10 (with 
quaeri) and 20.1. See below. 
16
 Wibier 2014 discusses the didactic use of quaestiones LQ*DLXV¶Institutes, with special 
interest for cases in which Gaius does not express a preference. Outside the legal sphere, we 
find the vocabulary of quaestiones FI*UHHNȗȘĲİ૙ĲĮȚȗȒĲȘȝĮDPRQJJUDPPDULDQVPHGLFDO
writers, and philosophers. Examples from Latin grammarians of the Early Empire are Scaur. 
24.3, 25.15, 27.3 K; Vel. 53.16 K; Acron ap. Char. 261.7 B; cf. for the spread of the 
terminology e.g. Quint. Inst. 1.5.68. Oikonomopoulou 2013 discusses (the vocabulary of) 
question-and-answer literature in medicine and philosophy (predominantly in Greek). 
17
 Manthe has decided to print linteum in the recent editio maior (Nelson and Manthe 2007) 
RQWKHDUJXPHQWWKDW*DLXV¶H[SODQDWLRQKDVOLWWOHWRGRZLWKZKDWDlicium was and actually 
describes a linteum (Manthe 2005, 167; cf. Nelson and Manthe 2007, 295). Given the 
ordinary meaning of linteum in the second century, this misrecognizes the scholarly quaestio 
that Gaius presents. Furthermore, any attempt to see the phrase quo necessariae partes 
tegerentur (which expresses purpose) as the only information of interest here faces a major 
challenge in that the formulation quid sit autem linteum/licium est does not encourage this 
UHDGLQJ2IFRXUVHWDNLQJ0DQWKH¶VSRLQWIXUWKHUDVNHSWLFDOUHDGHUPLJKWREMHFWWKDW*DLXV¶
quaestio is framed less precisely WKDQ,UHDGLWRUWKDWLWDVNVµwhat <this> linteum is <in the 
FRQWH[WRIWKLVODZ!¶. While I maintain that this is a contestable reading of the quaestio, I do 
not think that it ± if granted ± offsets my earlier arguments. 
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18
 The emendation was originally proposed by Van der Hoeven 1868, 258 (and universally 
accepted until Nelson and Manthe 2007) on the grounds that linteum would not need any 
clarification whatsoever. 
19
 See the photographic reproduction at Briguglio 2012, 124. 
20
 In addition, Professor Briguglio tells me per litteras that he cannot confirm abbreviation 
signs on the basis of the high-resolution, optically enhanced infrared images in his possession. 
Study of the original MS indicates that what Böcking (and the scholars on whose notes he 
based himself) and Studemund identified as (faded) abbreviation strokes must be letter 
characters on the other side of the parchment shining through. 
21
 On this nota, see Lindsay 1915, 273. On the inconsistent usage of notae in the codex 
Veronensis, see my n. 23 below.  
22
 *|VFKHQ*|VFKHQ+XVFKNH¶VHDUO\HGLWLRQV (starting 1860), and Giraud 1873 
prefer quare lex to quae res lex. The former reading appears to have been abandoned after the 
SXEOLFDWLRQRI6WXGHPXQG¶VDSRJUDSK, although the re-editions of Huschke reveal that 
he held onto it until his death in 1886. 
23
 7KHIOXLGLW\RI9¶Vnotae becomes crystal clear from the table of abbreviations at the back 
RI6WXGHPXQG¶VDSRJUDSK7KHOLVWUHSRUWVWKDW5֛  in this MS can designate many things (res, 
rem, re, respondit, rescriptum, rubrica, rubra, regula). Consequently, should future high-tech 
readings of V reveal 5֛ instead of R, one might still argue for the resolution re rather than res 
on the basis of the flexible usage of this symbol. Note that two lines down on the same MS 
page r is used for re (fol. 34v. line 11; I read R, Studemund 5֛). Along the same lines, the table 
indicates that the use of q / Tժ  is flexible too, thereby barring a mechanical, one-solution 
23 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
expansion for the first character of the sequence q r l(ex) (cf. in particular Inst. 2.188, fol. 22v. 
line 5). Finally, might q r somehow be a variant of the nota for quare? The classic form of 
this nota is qUժ  (with some variations, it seems; Lindsay 1915, 225); those in favor of arguing 
that q r is a variant of qUժ  may find support one line up in the MS where (it seems) we read at 
for autem (instead of the classic nota form aWժ ; Lindsay 1915, 13). 
24
 For so-called inferential quare, see OLD s.v. %7KHµORJLF¶RIWKHSDVVDJHZDVFRQWHVWHG
by several textual critics in the nineteenth century. See for example Polenaar 1876 app. ad 
loc. for a discussion with older references. 
25
 See for example at Dig. 48.5.39.2 (Papinian) and Dig. 49.4.1.7 (Ulpian). 
26
 This edition is the end point of a series of revisions and updates starting from Huschke 
1860. Its enduring popularity emerges from its use by Gordon and Robinson 1988 and 
Crawford 1996, 2: 558 without any argument. 
27
 David 1963 with Nelson 1981. The editio maior (slightly adapted) is now Nelson and 
Manthe 2007. This reading is also printed by Krüger and Studemund 1877 (only in their first 
edition) upon Mommsen¶V personal urging, Muirhead 1880, and Reinach 2002. Though not 
printing it, De Zulueta 1946-52 considers this reading not impossible. 
28
 res [lex tota] : e.g. Polenaar 1876, Dubois 1881, Krüger and Studemund all editions post 
1877, Girard 1923, Bizoukides 1937-39, Baviera 1940-43, and De Zulueta 1946-52. Kniep 
1917, 55 is favorable to this reading, but keeps lex tota in the text as an apposition to res that 
PD\EHWKHZRUNRID³Nachgajaner´. 
29




                                                                                                                                                        
30
 Roman legal historians generally hold that the search could not in fact be refused in Archaic 
Rome but that Gaius was ignorant of this. See Nelson and Manthe 2007, 156. 
31
 Nelson and Manthe 2007, 156, as part of their argument for reading quae res [lex]  tota 
ridicula est. It should be pointed out that their argument seems to drift in two directions. 
While focusing on the uselessness of both searchHVWKH\DOVRFODLPWKDW*DLXV³hielt daher die 
Regelung des Zwölftafelgesetzes für lächerlich´. This latter point seems (at first sight) an 
argument in favor of reading lex. Since they nonetheless print res, I take it that they look 
beyond the quaestio lance et licio provisioQQDUURZO\FRQFHLYHGDQGWKDW³Regelung´ is a 
collective). 
32
 Bizoukides is most vocal about this (1937-39, 2: 121 n. 554). It also appears to be the 
UHDVRQLQJEHKLQG0RPPVHQ¶VVXJJHVWLRQVHH.UJHUDQG6WXGHPXQGapp. ad loc.). 
Bizoukides claims that lex tota can only refer to the Twelve Tables as a whole, yet this is not 
the most straightforward interpretation. While it is undeniable that Gaius uses the singular lex 
in all cases in which he unambiguously refers to the Twelve Tables as a whole, he also uses 
the singular to refer to specific provisions. In 3.193, lex tota is probably most easily 
understood as the provision about the quaestio lance et licio. But the preceding sections make 
it somewhat ambiguous: in 3.191 we find ex lege XII tabularum, which seems continued by 
the first (and possibly also the second) lex of 3.192. 
33
 e.g. Plaut. Curc. 399-403, Amph. 928-30; cf. also Hor. Epist. 2.1.23-7 and Sen. Ep. 114.13. 
In juristic texts, we regularly find the predicates ridiculus and absurdus in connection to 
VRPHRQH¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIDSDUWLFXODUDXWKRULWDWLYHIRUPXODWLRQRIWKHODZUDWKHUWKDQDVD
critique of the law itself.  
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34
 See my n. 32 above. 
35
 Nörr 1974, 92-DUJXHVWKDW*DLXV¶FULWLTXHVDUHWDUJHWHGWRZDUGVRXWGDWHGSRLQWVRIODZ 
36
 Similarly*DLXV¶IDPRXVFULWLTXHRIWKHQHHGIRUZRPHQWRKDYHtutores (an old institute 
probably connected in some way to the Twelve Tables) mainly targets the popular 
explanation for it (vulgo crediturQDPHO\WKDWWKLVLVVXSSRVHGO\GXHWRZRPHQ¶Vlevitas 
animi (the point is called magis speciosa ... quam vera at Inst. 1.190); yet by extension it 
undercuts the very legal institute itself. Note furtheU*DLXV¶UHPDUNWKDW, in the case of a suit 
on damnum infecti, which was the only case still allowing a legis actio in his day next to other 
remedies, no one will actually choose the legis actio (nemo vult lege agere, 4.31).  
37
 See, for example, Harries 2007, 50-54; Howley 2013. 
38
 )DYRULQXV¶PRVWKHDWHGUHMHFWLRQRIWKH7ZHOYH7DEOHVLQYROYHVKLVFDOOLQJ³ridiculous´ the 
infinite spiral of violence (that he sees) resulting from the regulation on talio (res ridiculae 
atrocitatis, 20.1.18) because retaliation can by definition never be identical to the injury. To 
EHVXUHHYHQWKRXJKWKHSKUDVHRORJ\FRPHVYHU\FORVHWR*DLXV¶DWWKLVSDVVDJHLQ
*HOOLXVZRXOGLQPDQ\ZD\VFRQVWLWXWHDPLVOHDGLQJSDUDOOHOVLQFH)DYRULQXV¶ULdicule 
focuses on the extreme and hypothetical consequences of a very particular reading of the law 
UDWKHUWKDQWKDWLWFDOOVWKHODZLWVHOIULGLFXORXVFI&DHFLOLXV¶ULSRVWHlubitum est arguendi, 
20.1.21). 
39
 The most convenient overview is provided by the indices to Lenel 1889. 
40
 The earliest selection and discussion of the Twelve Tables about which there is some 
certain information is that of Sextus Aelius (consul 198 BCE); see e.g. Cic. Leg. 2.59, Dig. 
1.2.2.38 (Pomponius). Cicero refers to multiple Twelve-Table commentators in his Leg., e.g. 
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DW:KLOH/DEHR¶VZDVWKHDXWKRULWDWLYHFRPPHQWDU\XQWLO*DLXV¶LWLVOLNHO\WKDW
0DVXULXV6DELQXV¶Liber memorialium included discussions pertaining to the Twelve Tables 
too, as did his work De furtis (see Gell. 11.18.13). 
41
 As has long been suggested, the two consecutive fragments in the Digest that are ascribed 
WR0RGHVWLQXV¶Ad Mucium (fl. later Severan Age) are probably a red herring (41.1.53, 54). 
Both excerpts are inscribed with idem rather than their auWKRU¶VQDPHDQGWKH\IROORZ
immediately on an excerpt ascribed by name to Modestinus. Since inscriptions are notorious 
for their corruptions and the work by Modestinus is otherwise unattested, suspicion seems 
justified. Following the anonymous scholiast to the BasilicaPDQ\KDYHSRVLWHG3RPSRQLXV¶
authorship (sch. B. 13.1.13.10 Sch.-Holw.; Mommsen app. ad Dig. 41.1.53, Lenel 1889, 2: 
col. 69 n. 5, col. 75 n. 3). 
42
 7KHWLWOHRI6DELQXV¶ZRUNIuris civilis libri III, is often taken as a sign that he based 
KLPVHOIRQ40XFLXV6FDHYROD¶VDe iure civili. The first attested work Ad Sabinum is by 
Pomponius. 
